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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jacob Jarome Buck appeals from

his conviction, entered on his

conditional guilty plea to possessing a controlled substance.

Buck challenges

the district court's ruling denying his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officer Simon of the Caldwell Police Department pulled over Jacob
Jarome Buck for failing to stop at a stop sign. (R., p. 9.) Buck admitted to Simon
that his license was suspended, and he was unable to provide proof of
insurance. (R., p. 9.) A records check revealed Buck had a recent conviction for
no insurance.

(R., p. 9.)

Corporal Baldwin engaged his certified canine

narcotics dog, Remko, to do a sniff-test of Buck's car. (R., p. 9.) Remko alerted
to the passenger and driver's side doors. (R., p. 9.)
On a search of Buck's car, the officers found 38 Lortab prescription
narcotic analgesic pills and two baggies of a white crystalline substance. (R., p.
9.)

The

crystalline

substance

tested

presumptively

positive

for

methamphetamine. (R., p. 9.) The officers also found a digital scale under the
driver's seat.

(R., p. 9.)

Buck was arrested, then charged with two counts of

possessing a controlled substance, and later, a persistent violator charge. (R.,
pp. 9, 11-12, 22-23, 24-25, 27-28.)
Buck moved to suppress the evidence found in his car, arguing the police
lacked probable cause for their search.

(R., pp. 51-53, 63-66; see Tr.)

The

district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion and heard
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testimony from Buck and Baldwin. (See generally Tr.) Buck argued that Remko
was unreliable, citing Baldwin's testimony that Remko was trained using a
reward method that is not universally accepted. (R., pp. 65-66; Tr., p. 41, L. 24 p. 45, L. 13.) The district court found that Remko was reliable, thus supporting
probable cause, and denied suppression. (R., pp. 79-85.)
After a day of trial, Buck entered into a conditional plea agreement. (R.,
pp. 104-13.)

Buck pleaded guilty to felony possession of methamphetamine,

agreed that a suspended sentence of seven years with three years fixed and a
three-year probationary period was appropriate, and reserved the right to appeal
the district court's ruling on his suppression motion. (R., pp. 112-23.) The state
dismissed Buck's persistent violator charge, and the district court sentenced
Buck to seven years with three years fixed, suspended, and placed Buck on
probation for three years.

(R., pp. 120-24.)

judgment. (R., pp. 130-32.)
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Buck timely appealed from the

ISSUE
Buck states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Buck's motion to
suppress the State's evidence?
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Applying the law to the facts of this case, did the district court properly deny
Buck's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Applying The Law To The Facts Of This Case, The District Court Properly
Denied Buck's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Buck asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

According to Buck, the narcotics dog used in the search of his vehicle was
unreliable, thus the police lacked probable cause and evidence obtained from
their search was inadmissible. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-8.) However, the record
supports the district court's finding that the narcotics dog was reliable.
B.

Standard Of Review
When a decision on a suppression motion is challenged, the appellate

court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584,
_, 301 P.3d 242, 251 (2013).

The appellate court accepts the trial court's

factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence, and freely reviews
the application of constitutional principles to those facts.
C.

kl

Police Had Probable Cause To Search Buck's Car Because The Record
Shows That Remko Was A Certified, Reliable Narcotics Dog
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and

seizures.

State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012).

"A

warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement."

State v.

Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted).
One such exception is the "automobile exception," which authorizes a
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warrantless search of a vehicle and the containers therein when there is
probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of
criminal activity.

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572 (1991); State v.

Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842, 979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999).
Probable cause is established if the facts available to the officer at the
time of the search would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that
the area or items to be searched contained contraband or evidence of a crime."
State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (2007) (citing U.S.
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982)). Probable cause to conduct a warrantless
search is satisfied "when a reliable drug-detection dog indicates that a lawfully
stopped automobile contains the odor of controlled substances."

Yeoumans,

144 Idaho at 873, 172 P.3d at 1148 (citation omitted).
Where probable cause is based on a drug-detection dog's alert, the
defendant "must have an opportunity to challenge [the] evidence of [the] dog's
reliability." Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1057 (2013). The trial court then
considers the evidence and determines "whether all the facts surrounding a
dog's alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably
prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a
crime."

kl at 1058.

On review of rulings from suppression motions, the appellate courts reject
"rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible,
all-things-considered approach."

kl at

1055; Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172

P.3d at 1148. Probable cause is "a fluid concept - turning on the assessment of
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probabilities in particular factual contexts." Harris, 133 S.Ct. at 1056 (citation
omitted).

A deficiency as to one matter may be balanced out by a strong

showing as to other indicia of reliability, such as "a dog's satisfactory
performance in a certification or training program." kl_ at 1056-57; Yeoumans,
144 Idaho at 874, 172 P.3d at 1149 (a dog's response to residual odors is just
one factor bearing upon its reliability).

"[F]or purposes of the probable cause

analysis, [appellate courts] are concerned with probability, not certainty."
Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 874, 172 P.3d at 1149 (quoting State v. Cabral, 159
Md.App. 354 (2004)); see also Harris, 133 S.Ct. at 1055.
In Yeoumans, the court held that "[a]n alert by an otherwise reliable,
certified drug detection dog is sufficient to demonstrate probable cause to
believe contraband is present even if there exists a possibility that a drug dog
has alerted to residual odors." Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 874, 172 P.3d at 1149.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Harris held that, where a dog has been certified by a
bona fide organization after testing the dog's reliability in a controlled setting, "a
court can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that the dog's
alert provides probable cause to search." Harris, 133 S.Ct. at 1057.
Buck acknowledges the district court found that Remko was reliable as a
narcotics dog. (Appellant's brief, p. 7 (citing R., p. 84).) There is no dispute that
Remko and Baldwin "passed their initial certification and have always passed
their recertification testing on the first attempt." (R., p. 81.) Also uncontested are
the district court's findings that Remko "has never had a false alert during
certification testing," and "has never failed ... recertification tests," and that
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Remko and Baldwin "participate in frequent ongoing refresher trainings ... [that]
occur as frequently as on a weekly to tri-weekly basis." (R., p. 81; see also Tr.,
p. 38, L. 21 - p. 40, L. 15.)
However, Buck argues Remko was unreliable because he was "exposed
to ... a flawed training methodology." (Appellant's brief, p. 7 (citing R., pp. 7984).)

The methodology at issue was Corporal Baldwin's practice of rewarding

Remko for giving a "hard alert" to the smell of drugs, even before confirming the
presence of drugs. (Tr., p. 42, L. 13 - p. 43, L. 10.) Buck's characterization of
this training practice as "discredited" is unsupported by the record. (Appellant's
brief, p. 1.)
In support of his argument, Buck cites only Baldwin's testimony about the
training practice. (Appellant's brief, p. 7.) According to Baldwin, other handlers
in a recent training suggested, "maybe wait until you actually find the drug,
because some dogs ... catch on to the reward part and might start lying to you."
(Tr., p. 71, L. 24 - p. 72, L. 2.)

Baldwin described the contrasting training

practices as "a big debate," and explained "the theory behind" not rewarding a
dog until drugs have been pulled. (Tr., p. 43, Ls. 5-7; p. 45, Ls. 8-13.) Baldwin
also testified that he had always used his reward method with Remko and
continues to do so when Remko alerts with a "hard positive." (Tr., p. 71, L. 16 p. 72, L. 6.)

Nothing in the record demonstrates that Baldwin's reward method,
although disfavored by some trainers, had in fact diluted Remko's reliability.
Further, as in Yeoumans, this one factor possibly weighing against Remko's
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reliability does not by itself show that the district court's reliability finding is
unsupported by substantial reliable evidence. Buck's argument that it must is the
sort of rigid legal conclusion consistently rejected by the courts. Harris, 133 S.Ct.
at 1055; Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172 P.3d at 1148. Looking at the totality
of circumstances, the record supports that police had probable cause, thus the
district court's ruling was proper.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order denying Buck's motion to suppress.
DATED this 23rd day of August, 2013.
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Deputy Attorney General
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